Empty implementations of the ``++X509TrustManager++`` interface are often created to allow connection to a host that is not signed by a root certificate authority. Such an implementation will accept any certificate, which leaves the application vulnerable to Man-in-the-middle attacks. The correct solution is to provide an appropriate trust store.
This rule raises an issue when an implementation of ``++X509TrustManager++`` never throws exception.
class TrustAllManager implements X509TrustManager {
@Override
public void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] x509Certificates, String s) throws CertificateException { // Noncompliant, nothing means trust any client
}
@Override
public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] x509Certificates, String s) throws CertificateException { // Noncompliant, this method never throws exception, it means trust any client