Create rule S7161: Tableau secrets should not be disclosed (#4497)
* Create rule S7161 * Add text * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Jamie Anderson <127742609+jamie-anderson-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: loris-s-sonarsource <loris-s-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Loris Sierra <loris.sierra@sonarsource.com> Co-authored-by: Loris S. <91723853+loris-s-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jamie Anderson <127742609+jamie-anderson-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com>
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@ -10,13 +10,11 @@ If an attacker gains access to a Grafana personal access token or Granafa Cloud
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Depending on the permissions given to the secret, the impact might range from the compromise of the data of some dashboards to a full takeover of the Grafana environment.
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:service_name: Grafana
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/impact/data_compromise.adoc[]
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==== Application takeover
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With control over the Grafana application, the attacker can modify dashboards, alter data sources, or inject malicious code. This can result in the manipulation of displayed data, misleading visualizations, or even the introduction of backdoors for further exploitation.
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The attacker may even attempt to escalate their privileges within the Grafana environment. By gaining administrative access or higher-level permissions, they can perform more significant actions, such as modifying access controls, adding or deleting users, or changing system configurations.
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/impact/dataviz_takeover.adoc[]
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== How to fix it
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2
rules/S7161/metadata.json
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2
rules/S7161/metadata.json
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{
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}
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rules/S7161/secrets/metadata.json
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rules/S7161/secrets/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Tableau secrets should not be disclosed",
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"type": "VULNERABILITY",
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"code": {
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"impacts": {
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"SECURITY": "HIGH"
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},
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"attribute": "TRUSTWORTHY"
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},
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"status": "ready",
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"remediation": {
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"func": "Constant\/Issue",
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"constantCost": "30min"
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},
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"tags": [
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"cwe",
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"cert"
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],
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"defaultSeverity": "Blocker",
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"ruleSpecification": "RSPEC-7161",
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"sqKey": "S7161",
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"scope": "All",
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"securityStandards": {
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"CWE": [
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798,
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259
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],
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"OWASP": [
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"A3"
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],
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"CERT": [
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"MSC03-J."
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],
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"OWASP Top 10 2021": [
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"A7"
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],
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"PCI DSS 3.2": [
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"6.5.10"
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],
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"PCI DSS 4.0": [
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"6.2.4"
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],
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"ASVS 4.0": [
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"2.10.4",
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"3.5.2",
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"6.4.1"
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],
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"STIG ASD_V5R3": [
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"V-222642"
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]
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},
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"defaultQualityProfiles": [
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"Sonar way"
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],
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"quickfix": "unknown"
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}
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46
rules/S7161/secrets/rule.adoc
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rules/S7161/secrets/rule.adoc
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/description.adoc[]
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== Why is this an issue?
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/rationale.adoc[]
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=== What is the potential impact?
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Tableau secrets scopes depend on the type of secret. From the most impactful to
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the least:
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1. Account passwords
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2. Personal access tokens (PAT)
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3. "Credentials token", received after a SignIn request
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Their scopes vary in terms of lifetime, access, and privileges.
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Below are some real-world scenarios that illustrate some impacts of an attacker
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exploiting the secret.
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:secret_type: secret
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:service_name: Tableau
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/impact/data_compromise.adoc[]
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/impact/dataviz_takeover.adoc[]
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== How to fix it
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/fix/revoke.adoc[]
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/fix/vault.adoc[]
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=== Code examples
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:example_secret: FMWBZfscS96flnAPXVY06w|QQsOzThG6hqNvZcd6OPIpZs88lgcYTcb|77bfee95-c689-4fd1-a7e0-2cf050adbbb2
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:example_name: tableau-auth
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:example_env: TABLEAU_AUTH
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/examples.adoc[]
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== Resources
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include::../../../shared_content/secrets/resources/standards.adoc[]
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12
shared_content/secrets/impact/dataviz_takeover.adoc
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12
shared_content/secrets/impact/dataviz_takeover.adoc
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==== Data visualization corruption and takeover
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With control over the {service_name} application, the attacker can modify
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dashboards, alter data sources, or inject malicious code. This can result in the
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manipulation of displayed data, misleading visualizations, or even the
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introduction of backdoors for further exploitation.
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The attacker may even attempt to escalate their privileges within the
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{service_name} environment. By gaining administrative access or higher-level
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permissions, they can perform more significant actions, such as modifying access
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controls, adding or deleting users, or changing system configurations.
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