Fix from review: fix spelling

frontend/public/covered_rules.json

@@ -5191,7 +5191,6 @@
     "S1940": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
     "S2053": "sonar-kotlin 2.3.0.609",
     "S2068": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
-    "S2083": "sonar-security master",
     "S2097": "sonar-kotlin 2.12.0.1956",
     "S2114": "sonar-kotlin 2.12.0.1956",
     "S2116": "sonar-kotlin 2.12.0.1956",
@@ -5223,7 +5222,6 @@
     "S5322": "sonar-kotlin 2.3.0.609",
     "S5324": "sonar-kotlin 2.2.0.499",
     "S5332": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
-    "S5344": "sonar-kotlin master",
     "S5527": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
     "S5542": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
     "S5547": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
@@ -5237,7 +5235,6 @@
     "S5867": "sonar-kotlin 2.6.0.862",
     "S5868": "sonar-kotlin 2.6.0.862",
     "S5869": "sonar-kotlin 2.6.0.862",
-    "S6096": "sonar-security master",
     "S6202": "sonar-kotlin 2.4.0.703",
     "S6207": "sonar-kotlin 2.15.0.2579",
     "S6218": "sonar-kotlin 2.4.0.703",
@@ -5260,7 +5257,6 @@
     "S6318": "sonar-kotlin 2.1.0.344",
     "S6362": "sonar-kotlin 2.5.0.754",
     "S6363": "sonar-kotlin 2.5.0.754",
-    "S6384": "sonar-security master",
     "S6432": "sonar-kotlin 2.11.0.1828",
     "S6474": "sonar-kotlin master",
     "S6508": "sonar-kotlin 2.14.0.2352",

rules/S6096/java/how-to-fix-it/java-se.adoc

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-== How to fix it in Java I/O API
+== How to fix it in Java SE
 
 === Code examples
 

rules/S6096/java/rule.adoc

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ include::../rationale.adoc[]
 
 include::../impact.adoc[]
 
-include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
+include::how-to-fix-it/java-se.adoc[]
 
 == Resources
 

rules/S6096/kotlin/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-== How to fix it in Java I/O API
-
-=== Code examples
-
-:canonicalization_function1: java.io.File.getCanonicalFile
-:canonicalization_function2: java.io.File.getCanonicalPath
-
-include::../../common/fix/code-rationale.adoc[]
-
-==== Noncompliant code example
-
-[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=noncompliant]
-----
-class Example {
-    companion object {
-        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/example/directory/"
-    }
-    fun extractEntry(zipFile: ZipFile) {
-        val entries = zipFile.entries()
-        val entry = entries.nextElement()
-        val inputStream = zipFile.getInputStream(entry)
-        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + entry.name)
-        inputStream.copyTo(file.outputStream())
-    }
-}
-----
-
-==== Compliant solution
-
-[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=compliant]
-----
-class Example {
-    companion object {
-        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/example/directory/"
-    }
-    fun extractEntry(zipFile: ZipFile) {
-        val entries = zipFile.entries()
-        val entry = entries.nextElement()
-        val inputStream = zipFile.getInputStream(entry)
-        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + entry.name)
-        val canonicalDestinationPath = file.canonicalPath
-        if (canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(TARGET_DIRECTORY)) {
-            inputStream.copyTo(file.outputStream())
-        }
-    }
-}
-----
-
-=== How does this work?
-
-include::../../common/fix/how-does-this-work.adoc[]
-
-=== Pitfalls
-
-include::../../common/pitfalls/partial-path-traversal.adoc[]
-
-For example, the following code is vulnerable to partial path injection. Note
-that the string `targetDirectory` does not end with a path separator:
-
-
-[source, kotlin]
-----
-companion object {
-    private const val targetDirectory = "/Users/John"
-}
-
-fun ExtractEntry(zipFile: ZipFile) {
-    val entries = zipFile.entries()
-    val entry = entries.nextElement()
-    val inputStream = zipFile.getInputStream(entry)
-
-    val file = File(entry.name)
-
-    val canonicalDestinationPath = file.canonicalPath
-    if (canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(targetDirectory)) {
-        Files.copy(inputStream, file.toPath(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING, LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS)
-    }
-}
-----
-
-This check can be bypassed because `"/Users/Johnny".startsWith("/Users/John")`
-returns `true`. Thus, for validation, `"/Users/John"` should actually be
-`"/Users/John/"`.
-
-**Warning**: Some functions, such as `.getCanonicalPath`, remove the
-terminating path separator in their return value. +
-The validation code should be tested to ensure that it cannot be impacted by this
-issue.
-
-https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-java/security/advisories/GHSA-c28r-hw5m-5gv3[Here is a real-life example of this vulnerability.]

rules/S6362/see.adoc

@@ -5,6 +5,3 @@
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7_2017-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS)[Top 10 2017 Category A7 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)]
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2023-risks/m8-security-misconfiguration[Mobile Top 10 2024 Category M8 - Security Misconfiguration]
 * CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79[CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')]
-
-=== Related rules
-* S7409 - Exposing Java objects through JavaScript interfaces is security-sensitive

rules/S6549/java/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-== How to fix it in Java SE
+== How to fix it in Java I/O API
 
 === Code examples
 
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ public class ExampleController
     static private String targetDirectory = "/path/to/target/directory/";
 
     @GetMapping(value = "/exists")
-    public void delete(@RequestParam("filename") String filename) throws IOException {
+    public void exists(@RequestParam("filename") String filename) throws IOException {
 
         File file = new File(targetDirectory + filename);
         if (!file.exists()) { // Noncompliant
-            throw new IOException("File does not exists in the target directory");
+            throw new IOException("File does not exist in the target directory");
         } 
     }
 }
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ public class ExampleController
     static private String targetDirectory = "/path/to/target/directory/";
 
     @GetMapping(value = "/exists")
-    public void delete(@RequestParam("filename") String filename) throws IOException {
+    public void exists(@RequestParam("filename") String filename) throws IOException {
 
         File file = new File(targetDirectory + filename);
         String canonicalDestinationPath = file.getCanonicalPath();
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ public class ExampleController
         if (!canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(targetDirectory)) {
             throw new IOException("Entry is outside of the target directory");
         } else if (!file.exists()) { 
-            throw new IOException("File does not exists in the target directory");
+            throw new IOException("File does not exist in the target directory");
         } 
     }
 }
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ that the string `targetDirectory` does not end with a path separator:
 static private String targetDirectory = "/Users/John";
 
 @GetMapping(value = "/endpoint")
-public void endpoint(@RequestParam("folder") fileName) throws IOException {
+public void endpoint(@RequestParam("folder") File fileName) throws IOException {
 
     String canonicalizedFileName = fileName.getCanonicalPath();
 

rules/S6549/java/rule.adoc

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ include::../impact.adoc[]
 
 // How to fix it section
 
-include::how-to-fix-it/java-se.adoc[]
+include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
 
 == Resources
 

rules/S6549/kotlin/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+== How to fix it in Java I/O API
+
+=== Code examples
+
+include::../../common/fix/code-rationale.adoc[]
+
+==== Noncompliant code example
+
+[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=noncompliant]
+----
+@Controller
+class ExampleController {
+    companion object {
+        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/path/to/target/directory/"
+    }
+    @GetMapping("/exists")
+    fun exists(@RequestParam("filename") filename: String) {
+
+        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + filename)
+        if (!file.exists()) { // Noncompliant
+            throw IOException("File does not exist in the target directory")
+        }
+    }
+}
+----
+
+==== Compliant solution
+
+[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=compliant]
+----
+@Controller
+class ExampleController {
+    companion object {
+        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/path/to/target/directory/"
+    }
+    @GetMapping("/exists")
+    fun exists(@RequestParam("filename") filename: String) {
+
+        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + filename)
+        val canonicalDestinationPath = file.getCanonicalPath()
+
+        if (!canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(TARGET_DIRECTORY)) {
+            throw IOException("Entry is outside of the target directory")
+        } else if (!file.exists()) {
+            throw IOException("File does not exist in the target directory")
+        }
+    }
+}
+----
+
+=== How does this work?
+
+:canonicalization_function: java.io.File.getCanonicalPath
+
+include::../../common/fix/canonical-path-validation.adoc[]
+
+=== Pitfalls
+
+include::../../common/pitfalls/partial-path-traversal.adoc[]
+
+For example, the following code is vulnerable to partial path injection. Note
+that the string `targetDirectory` does not end with a path separator:
+
+
+[source, kotlin]
+----
+companion object {
+    private val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/Users/John"
+}
+@GetMapping("/endpoint")
+fun endpoint(@RequestParam("folder") file: File) {
+    val canonicalizedFileName = file.getCanonicalPath()
+    if (!canonicalizedFileName.startsWith(TARGET_DIRECTORY)) {
+        throw IOException("Entry is outside of the target directory")
+    }
+}
+----
+
+This check can be bypassed if other directories start with `John`. For instance, `"/Users/Johnny".startsWith("/Users/John")`
+returns `true`. Thus, for validation, `"/Users/John"` should actually be
+`"/Users/John/"`.
+
+**Warning**: Some functions, such as `getCanonicalPath`, remove the
+terminating path separator in their return value. +
+The validation code should be tested to ensure that it cannot be impacted by this
+issue.
+
+https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-java/security/advisories/GHSA-c28r-hw5m-5gv3[Here is a real-life example of this vulnerability.]
+
+
+:joining_docs: https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/nio/file/Path.html
+:joining_func: java.nio.file.Path.resolve
+
+include::../../common/pitfalls/oob-specific-path-joining.adoc[]

rules/S6549/kotlin/metadata.json

@@ -16,14 +16,13 @@
       "M4"
     ],
     "PCI DSS 3.2": [
-      "6.5.1",
       "6.5.8"
     ],
     "PCI DSS 4.0": [
       "6.2.4"
     ],
     "ASVS 4.0": [
-      "12.3.4",
+      "12.3.1",
       "5.1.3",
       "5.1.4"
     ],

rules/S6549/kotlin/rule.adoc

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ include::../rationale.adoc[]
 
 include::../impact.adoc[]
 
+// How to fix it section
+
 include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
 
 == Resources
 
-include::../common/resources/articles.adoc[]
-
 include::../common/resources/standards-mobile.adoc[]
 
 ifdef::env-github,rspecator-view[]
@@ -20,4 +20,5 @@ ifdef::env-github,rspecator-view[]
 
 include::../message.adoc[]
 
+
 endif::env-github,rspecator-view[]

rules/S7409/kotlin/metadata.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "title": "Exposing Java objects through JavaScript interfaces is security-sensitive",
+  "title": "Exposing Java interfaces in WebViews is security-sensitive",
   "type": "SECURITY_HOTSPOT",
   "status": "ready",
   "remediation": {

rules/S7409/kotlin/rule.adoc

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-Using JavaScript interfaces in WebViews to expose Java objects is unsafe. Doing so allows JavaScript
+Using Javascript interfaces in WebViews is unsafe as it allows JavaScript to invoke Java methods,
-to invoke Java methods, potentially giving attackers access to data or sensitive app functionality.
+potentially giving attackers access to data or sensitive app functionality. WebViews might include
-WebViews might include untrusted sources such as third-party iframes, making this functionality
+untrusted sources such as third-party iframes, making this functionality particularly risky. As
-particularly risky. As JavaScript interfaces are passed to every frame in the WebView, those iframes
+Javascript interfaces are passed to every frame in the WebView, those iframes are also able to
-are also able to access the exposed Java object.
+access the exposed Java methods.
 
 == Ask Yourself Whether
 
 * The content in the WebView is fully trusted and secure.
 * Potentially untrusted iframes could be loaded in the WebView.
-* The JavaScript interface has to be exposed for the entire lifecycle of the WebView.
+* The Javascript interface has to be exposed for the entire lifecycle of the WebView.
-* The exposed Java object might be called by untrusted sources.
+* The exposed Java methods will accept input from potentially untrusted sources.
 
 There is a risk if you answered yes to any of these questions.
 
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ There is a risk if you answered yes to any of these questions.
 === Disable JavaScript
 
 If it is possible to disable JavaScript in the WebView, this is the most secure option. By default,
-JavaScript is disabled in a WebView, so ``webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(false)`` does not need to
+JavaScript is disabled in a WebView, so you do not need to explicitly call
-be explicitly called. Of course, sometimes it is necessary to enable JavaScript, in which case the
+``webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true)`` in your ``WebSettings`` configuration. Of course, sometimes
-following recommendations should be considered.
+it is necessary to enable JavaScript, in which case the following recommendations should be considered.
 
 === Remove JavaScript interface when loading untrusted content
 
@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ class ExampleActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
 
 == Compliant Solution
 
-The most secure option is to disable JavaScript entirely. S6362 further explains why it should not be enabled
+The most secure option is to disable JavaScript entirely.
-unless absolutely necessary.
 
 [source,kotlin]
 ----
@@ -97,8 +96,7 @@ class ExampleActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
 }
 ----
 
-If a JavaScript bridge must be used, consider using ``WebViewCompat.addWebMessageListener`` instead. This allows you to restrict
+If a JavaScript bridge must be used, consider using ``WebViewCompat.addWebMessageListener`` instead. This allows you to restrict the origins that can send messages to the JavaScript bridge.
-the origins that can send messages to the JavaScript bridge.
 
 [source,kotlin]
 ----
@@ -137,6 +135,3 @@ class ExampleActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2023-risks/m4-insufficient-input-output-validation.html[Mobile Top 10 2024 Category M4 - Insufficient Input/Output Validation]
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2023-risks/m8-security-misconfiguration.html[Mobile Top 10 2024 Category M8 - Security Misconfiguration]
 * CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79[CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation]
-
-=== Related rules
-* S6362 - Enabling JavaScript support for WebViews is security-sensitive