update coverage information (#4859)

Co-authored-by: SonarTech <sonartech@sonarsource.com>

docs/header_names/allowed_framework_names.adoc

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 * Java JWT
 * Java SE
 * Java JDBC API
+* Java I/O API
 * Jdom2
 * JSP
 * Legacy Mongo Java API

frontend/public/covered_rules.json

@@ -5191,6 +5191,7 @@
     "S1940": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
     "S2053": "sonar-kotlin 2.3.0.609",
     "S2068": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
+    "S2083": "sonar-security master",
     "S2097": "sonar-kotlin 2.12.0.1956",
     "S2114": "sonar-kotlin 2.12.0.1956",
     "S2116": "sonar-kotlin 2.12.0.1956",
@@ -5222,6 +5223,7 @@
     "S5322": "sonar-kotlin 2.3.0.609",
     "S5324": "sonar-kotlin 2.2.0.499",
     "S5332": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
+    "S5344": "sonar-kotlin master",
     "S5527": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
     "S5542": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
     "S5547": "sonar-kotlin 2.0.0.29",
@@ -5235,6 +5237,7 @@
     "S5867": "sonar-kotlin 2.6.0.862",
     "S5868": "sonar-kotlin 2.6.0.862",
     "S5869": "sonar-kotlin 2.6.0.862",
+    "S6096": "sonar-security master",
     "S6202": "sonar-kotlin 2.4.0.703",
     "S6207": "sonar-kotlin 2.15.0.2579",
     "S6218": "sonar-kotlin 2.4.0.703",
@@ -5257,6 +5260,7 @@
     "S6318": "sonar-kotlin 2.1.0.344",
     "S6362": "sonar-kotlin 2.5.0.754",
     "S6363": "sonar-kotlin 2.5.0.754",
+    "S6384": "sonar-security master",
     "S6432": "sonar-kotlin 2.11.0.1828",
     "S6474": "sonar-kotlin master",
     "S6508": "sonar-kotlin 2.14.0.2352",

rules/S2068/go/rule.adoc

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ include::../ask-yourself.adoc[]
 
 include::../recommended.adoc[]
 
+=== Exceptions
+
+* The rule ignores string literals that are used directly in Regexp methods.
+
 == Sensitive Code Example
 
 ----

rules/S2083/java/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-== How to fix it in Java SE
+== How to fix it in Java I/O API
 
 === Code examples
 
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ that the string `targetDirectory` does not end with a path separator:
 static private String targetDirectory = "/Users/John";
 
 @GetMapping(value = "/endpoint")
-public void endpoint(@RequestParam("folder") fileName) throws IOException {
+public void endpoint(@RequestParam("folder") File fileName) throws IOException {
 
     String canonicalizedFileName = fileName.getCanonicalPath();
 

rules/S2083/java/rule.adoc

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ include::../impact.adoc[]
 
 // How to fix it section
 
-include::how-to-fix-it/java-se.adoc[]
+include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
 
 == Resources
 

rules/S2083/kotlin/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+== How to fix it in Java I/O API
+
+=== Code examples
+
+:code_impact: delete
+
+include::../../common/fix/code-rationale.adoc[]
+
+==== Noncompliant code example
+
+[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=noncompliant]
+----
+@Controller
+class ExampleController {
+    companion object {
+        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/path/to/target/directory/"
+    }
+
+    @GetMapping("/delete")
+    fun delete(@RequestParam("filename") filename: String) {
+        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + filename)
+        file.delete()
+    }
+}
+----
+
+==== Compliant solution
+
+[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=compliant]
+----
+@Controller
+class ExampleController {
+    companion object {
+        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/path/to/target/directory/"
+        private val TARGET_PATH = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY).toPath().normalize()
+    }
+
+    @GetMapping("/delete")
+    fun delete(@RequestParam("filename") filename: String) {
+        val file = File(TARGET_PATH.toString() + filename)
+        if (!file.toPath().normalize().startsWith(TARGET_PATH)) {
+            throw IOException("Entry is outside of the target directory")
+        }
+        file.delete()
+    }
+}
+----
+
+=== How does this work?
+
+:canonicalization_function: java.io.File.getCanonicalPath
+
+include::../../common/fix/self-validation.adoc[]
+
+=== Pitfalls
+
+include::../../common/pitfalls/partial-path-traversal.adoc[]
+
+For example, the following code is vulnerable to partial path injection. Note
+that the string `targetDirectory` does not end with a path separator:
+
+
+[source, kotlin]
+----
+companion object {
+    private val targetDirectory: String = "/Users/John"
+}
+
+@GetMapping("/endpoint")
+fun endpoint(@RequestParam("folder") file: File) {
+    val canonicalizedFileName = file.getCanonicalPath()
+    if (!canonicalizedFileName .startsWith(targetDirectory)) {
+        throw IOException("Entry is outside of the target directory");
+    }
+    file.delete()
+}
+----
+
+This check can be bypassed because `"/Users/Johnny".startsWith("/Users/John")`
+returns `true`. Thus, for validation, `"/Users/John"` should actually be
+`"/Users/John/"`.
+
+**Warning**: Some functions, such as `.getCanonicalPath`, remove the
+terminating path separator in their return value. +
+The validation code should be tested to ensure that it cannot be impacted by this
+issue.
+
+https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-java/security/advisories/GHSA-c28r-hw5m-5gv3[Here is a real-life example of this vulnerability.]
+
+
+:joining_docs: https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/nio/file/Path.html
+:joining_func: java.nio.file.Path.resolve
+
+include::../../common/pitfalls/oob-specific-path-joining.adoc[]

rules/S2083/kotlin/metadata.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+  "securityStandards": {
+    "CWE": [
+      20,
+      22
+    ],
+    "OWASP": [
+      "A5",
+      "A1"
+    ],
+    "OWASP Top 10 2021": [
+      "A1",
+      "A3"
+    ],
+    "OWASP Mobile Top 10 2024": [
+      "M4"
+    ],
+    "PCI DSS 3.2": [
+      "6.5.8"
+    ],
+    "PCI DSS 4.0": [
+      "6.2.4"
+    ],
+    "ASVS 4.0": [
+      "12.3.1",
+      "5.1.3",
+      "5.1.4"
+    ],
+    "STIG ASD_V5R3": [
+      "V-222609"
+    ]
+  }
+}

rules/S2083/kotlin/rule.adoc

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+== Why is this an issue?
+
+include::../rationale.adoc[]
+
+include::../impact.adoc[]
+
+// How to fix it section
+
+include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
+
+== Resources
+
+include::../common/resources/standards-mobile.adoc[]
+
+ifdef::env-github,rspecator-view[]
+
+'''
+== Implementation Specification
+(visible only on this page)
+
+include::../message.adoc[]
+
+'''
+== Comments And Links
+(visible only on this page)
+
+include::../comments-and-links.adoc[]
+
+endif::env-github,rspecator-view[]

rules/S6096/java/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-== How to fix it in Java SE
+== How to fix it in Java I/O API
 
 === Code examples
 

rules/S6096/java/rule.adoc

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ include::../rationale.adoc[]
 
 include::../impact.adoc[]
 
-include::how-to-fix-it/java-se.adoc[]
+include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
 
 == Resources
 

rules/S6096/kotlin/how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+== How to fix it in Java I/O API
+
+=== Code examples
+
+:canonicalization_function1: java.io.File.getCanonicalFile
+:canonicalization_function2: java.io.File.getCanonicalPath
+
+include::../../common/fix/code-rationale.adoc[]
+
+==== Noncompliant code example
+
+[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=noncompliant]
+----
+class Example {
+    companion object {
+        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/example/directory/"
+    }
+    fun extractEntry(zipFile: ZipFile) {
+        val entries = zipFile.entries()
+        val entry = entries.nextElement()
+        val inputStream = zipFile.getInputStream(entry)
+        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + entry.name)
+        inputStream.copyTo(file.outputStream())
+    }
+}
+----
+
+==== Compliant solution
+
+[source,kotlin,diff-id=1,diff-type=compliant]
+----
+class Example {
+    companion object {
+        private const val TARGET_DIRECTORY = "/example/directory/"
+    }
+    fun extractEntry(zipFile: ZipFile) {
+        val entries = zipFile.entries()
+        val entry = entries.nextElement()
+        val inputStream = zipFile.getInputStream(entry)
+        val file = File(TARGET_DIRECTORY + entry.name)
+        val canonicalDestinationPath = file.canonicalPath
+        if (canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(TARGET_DIRECTORY)) {
+            inputStream.copyTo(file.outputStream())
+        }
+    }
+}
+----
+
+=== How does this work?
+
+include::../../common/fix/how-does-this-work.adoc[]
+
+=== Pitfalls
+
+include::../../common/pitfalls/partial-path-traversal.adoc[]
+
+For example, the following code is vulnerable to partial path injection. Note
+that the string `targetDirectory` does not end with a path separator:
+
+
+[source, kotlin]
+----
+companion object {
+    private const val targetDirectory = "/Users/John"
+}
+
+fun ExtractEntry(zipFile: ZipFile) {
+    val entries = zipFile.entries()
+    val entry = entries.nextElement()
+    val inputStream = zipFile.getInputStream(entry)
+
+    val file = File(entry.name)
+
+    val canonicalDestinationPath = file.canonicalPath
+    if (canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(targetDirectory)) {
+        Files.copy(inputStream, file.toPath(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING, LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS)
+    }
+}
+----
+
+This check can be bypassed because `"/Users/Johnny".startsWith("/Users/John")`
+returns `true`. Thus, for validation, `"/Users/John"` should actually be
+`"/Users/John/"`.
+
+**Warning**: Some functions, such as `.getCanonicalPath`, remove the
+terminating path separator in their return value. +
+The validation code should be tested to ensure that it cannot be impacted by this
+issue.
+
+https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-java/security/advisories/GHSA-c28r-hw5m-5gv3[Here is a real-life example of this vulnerability.]

rules/S6096/kotlin/metadata.json

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+  "securityStandards": {
+    "CWE": [
+      20,
+      22
+    ],
+    "OWASP": [
+      "A5",
+      "A1"
+    ],
+    "OWASP Top 10 2021": [
+      "A1",
+      "A3"
+    ],
+    "OWASP Mobile Top 10 2024": [
+      "M4"
+    ],
+    "PCI DSS 3.2": [
+      "6.5.1",
+      "6.5.8"
+    ],
+    "PCI DSS 4.0": [
+      "6.2.4"
+    ],
+    "ASVS 4.0": [
+      "12.3.4",
+      "5.1.3",
+      "5.1.4"
+    ],
+    "STIG ASD_V5R3": [
+      "V-222609"
+    ]
+  }
+}

rules/S6096/kotlin/rule.adoc

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+== Why is this an issue?
+
+include::../rationale.adoc[]
+
+include::../impact.adoc[]
+
+include::how-to-fix-it/java-io-api.adoc[]
+
+== Resources
+
+include::../common/resources/articles.adoc[]
+
+include::../common/resources/standards-mobile.adoc[]
+
+ifdef::env-github,rspecator-view[]
+
+'''
+== Implementation Specification
+(visible only on this page)
+
+include::../message.adoc[]
+
+endif::env-github,rspecator-view[]

rules/S6362/see.adoc

@@ -5,3 +5,6 @@
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7_2017-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS)[Top 10 2017 Category A7 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)]
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2023-risks/m8-security-misconfiguration[Mobile Top 10 2024 Category M8 - Security Misconfiguration]
 * CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79[CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')]
+
+=== Related rules
+* S7409 - Exposing Java objects through JavaScript interfaces is security-sensitive

rules/S7409/kotlin/metadata.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "title": "Exposing Java interfaces in WebViews is security-sensitive",
+  "title": "Exposing Java objects through JavaScript interfaces is security-sensitive",
   "type": "SECURITY_HOTSPOT",
   "status": "ready",
   "remediation": {

rules/S7409/kotlin/rule.adoc

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-Using Javascript interfaces in WebViews is unsafe as it allows JavaScript to invoke Java methods,
-potentially giving attackers access to data or sensitive app functionality. WebViews might include
-untrusted sources such as third-party iframes, making this functionality particularly risky. As
-Javascript interfaces are passed to every frame in the WebView, those iframes are also able to
-access the exposed Java methods.
+Using JavaScript interfaces in WebViews to expose Java objects is unsafe. Doing so allows JavaScript
+to invoke Java methods, potentially giving attackers access to data or sensitive app functionality.
+WebViews might include untrusted sources such as third-party iframes, making this functionality
+particularly risky. As JavaScript interfaces are passed to every frame in the WebView, those iframes
+are also able to access the exposed Java object.
 
 == Ask Yourself Whether
 
 * The content in the WebView is fully trusted and secure.
 * Potentially untrusted iframes could be loaded in the WebView.
-* The Javascript interface has to be exposed for the entire lifecycle of the WebView.
-* The exposed Java methods will accept input from potentially untrusted sources.
+* The JavaScript interface has to be exposed for the entire lifecycle of the WebView.
+* The exposed Java object might be called by untrusted sources.
 
 There is a risk if you answered yes to any of these questions.
 
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ There is a risk if you answered yes to any of these questions.
 === Disable JavaScript
 
 If it is possible to disable JavaScript in the WebView, this is the most secure option. By default,
-JavaScript is disabled in a WebView, so you do not need to explicitly call
-``webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true)`` in your ``WebSettings`` configuration. Of course, sometimes
-it is necessary to enable JavaScript, in which case the following recommendations should be considered.
+JavaScript is disabled in a WebView, so ``webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(false)`` does not need to
+be explicitly called. Of course, sometimes it is necessary to enable JavaScript, in which case the
+following recommendations should be considered.
 
 === Remove JavaScript interface when loading untrusted content
 
@@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ class ExampleActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
 
 == Compliant Solution
 
-The most secure option is to disable JavaScript entirely.
+The most secure option is to disable JavaScript entirely. S6362 further explains why it should not be enabled
+unless absolutely necessary.
 
 [source,kotlin]
 ----
@@ -96,7 +97,8 @@ class ExampleActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
 }
 ----
 
-If a JavaScript bridge must be used, consider using ``WebViewCompat.addWebMessageListener`` instead. This allows you to restrict the origins that can send messages to the JavaScript bridge.
+If a JavaScript bridge must be used, consider using ``WebViewCompat.addWebMessageListener`` instead. This allows you to restrict
+the origins that can send messages to the JavaScript bridge.
 
 [source,kotlin]
 ----
@@ -135,3 +137,6 @@ class ExampleActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2023-risks/m4-insufficient-input-output-validation.html[Mobile Top 10 2024 Category M4 - Insufficient Input/Output Validation]
 * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2023-risks/m8-security-misconfiguration.html[Mobile Top 10 2024 Category M8 - Security Misconfiguration]
 * CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79[CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation]
+
+=== Related rules
+* S6362 - Enabling JavaScript support for WebViews is security-sensitive