Android components that are exported can be used by other applications. This may give access to functionalities that should remain private. == Why is this an issue? Once an Android component has been exported, it can be used by attackers to launch malicious actions and might also give access to other components that are not exported. For this reason, the following components should be protected: * Providers * Activities * Activity-aliases * Services === What is the potential impact? When components are exported unintentionally, they can be accessed and manipulated by other applications, potentially leading to unauthorized data access, data corruption, or even control over certain functionalities of the application. Below are some real-world scenarios that illustrate some impacts of an attacker exploiting the vulnerability: ==== Unauthorized Data Access If a component that handles sensitive data is exported, other applications can potentially access this data. For instance, if an activity that displays private messages is exported, a malicious application could send an intent to this activity and read the user's private messages. ==== Unwanted Control Over Application Functionality If a broadcast receiver is exported, other applications can send intents to it, triggering it to perform actions. This could lead to unwanted behaviors. For instance, a malicious application could trigger a receiver that starts a certain activity, causing the user's device to open unwanted screens, consume unnecessary resources, or even perform harmful actions. == How to fix it === Code examples ==== Noncompliant code example This sample exports a provider and does not define permissions: [source,xml,diff-id=1,diff-type=noncompliant] ---- ---- This sample exports a provider and does not define `READ` permission: [source,xml,diff-id=2,diff-type=noncompliant] ---- ---- This sample exports a provider and does not define permissions: [source,xml,diff-id=3,diff-type=noncompliant] ---- ---- ==== Compliant solution [source,xml,diff-id=1,diff-type=compliant] ---- ---- [source,xml,diff-id=2,diff-type=compliant] ---- ---- [source,xml,diff-id=3,diff-type=compliant] ---- ---- === How does this work? The preferred way to protect components is to set ``++exported++`` to ``++false++``. The component is not exported and can only be used by its application. If the component, such as a provider, has to be exported because it is shared with some other application, add `android:readPermission` and `android:writePermission` attributes. Another way to secure access to components is to create a permission with the ``++++`` tag and add it to the component with the ``++android:permission++`` attribute. === Pitfalls When targeting Android API versions lower than 12, intent filters will cause ``++exported++`` to be set to ``++true++`` by default. == Resources === Documentation * Android Documentation - https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element#plevel[protection level] * Android Documentation - https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/content-provider-creating#Permissions[Implement content provider permissions] === Standards * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2016-risks/m1-improper-platform-usage[Mobile Top 10 2016 Category M1] - Improper platform usage * OWASP - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/2016-risks/m2-insecure-data-storage[Mobile Top 10 2016 Category M2 - Insecure Data Storage] * CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/926[CWE-926 - Improper Export of Android Application Components] === External coding guidelines * OWASP - https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/masvs/security-requirements/0x11-v6-interaction_with_the_environment[Mobile AppSec Verification Standard - V6: Platform Interaction Requirements] ifdef::env-github,rspecator-view[] ''' == Implementation Specification (visible only on this page) === Message Implement permissions on this exported component. endif::env-github,rspecator-view[]