rspec/rules/S6173/impact.adoc
github-actions[bot] 25191f2751
Create rule S6173: Reflection should not be vulnerable to injection attacks (C#), move to LaYC format (#2644)
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[here](https://sonarsource.github.io/rspec/#/rspec/S6173/csharp)
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---------

Co-authored-by: loris-s-sonarsource <loris-s-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Loris Sierra <loris.sierra@sonarsource.com>
Co-authored-by: Loris S <91723853+loris-s-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jamie Anderson <127742609+jamie-anderson-sonarsource@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-07-28 17:38:46 +02:00

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=== What is the potential impact?
If user-supplied values are used to choose which code is executed, an attacker
may be able to supply carefully-chosen values that cause unexpected code to run.
The attacker can use this ability to run arbitrary code on the server.
Below are some real-world scenarios that illustrate some impacts of an attacker
exploiting the vulnerability.
==== Application-specific attacks
In this scenario, the attackers succeed in injecting a seemingly-legitimate
object, but whose properties might be used maliciously.
Depending on the application, attackers might be able to modify important data
structures or content to escalate privileges or perform unwanted actions.
For example, with an e-commerce application, this could be changing the number
of products or prices.
==== Full application compromise
In the worst-case scenario, the attackers succeed in injecting an object
triggering code execution.
Depending on the attacker, code execution can be used with different
intentions:
* Download the internal server's data, most likely to sell it.
* Modify data, install malware, for instance, malware that mines cryptocurrencies.
* Stop services or exhaust resources, for instance, with fork bombs.
This threat is particularly insidious if the attacked organization does not
maintain a Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP).
==== Root privilege escalation and pivot
In this scenario, the attacker can do everything described in the previous
section. The difference is that the attacker additionally manages to elevate
their privileges as an administrator and attack other servers.
Here, the impact depends on how much the target company focuses on its Defense
In Depth. For example, the entire infrastructure can be compromised through a
combination of unsafe deserialization and misconfiguration:
* Docker or Kubernetes clusters
* cloud services
* network firewalls and routing
* OS access control